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Abstract 
 
Psychological warfare, the use of propaganda to aid military operations, acquired 
prominence in British strategy in the early Cold War Middle East.  This article argues 
planning made limited progress until the 1956 Suez crisis.  Suez produced optimism 
about propaganda's ability to address threats from Egypt, the USSR and the Yemen.  
In Oman, Aden and Cyprus, psychological warfare was practiced to demoralise 
enemies, bolster allies and counter smears about British conduct.  Only mixed results 
ensued though, and doubts about the military’s involvement in propaganda lingered.  
Psychological warfare endured because it was a cheap option that might sometimes 
work, and could induce opponents to surrender rather than fight on. 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1947 the British Army’s future leaders in training at the Staff College learned ‘The 
propaganda battle has come to stay.’ 1   For a generation exposed to total war, 
concluding hostilities by persuasion was an attractive proposition, with the promise of 
bloodless victories. 2   Amidst relative international decline the potential for 
propaganda to compensate for waning diplomatic and military power could not easily 
be ignored.3   Psychological warfare (or psywar), like aerial bombing and special 
forces, offered cheaper strategic effects for statesmen struggling to hold their 
country’s ambitious place in the world order.4  The technique was understood as 
‘psychological measures, including information, propaganda and others, designed to 
influence the opinions, emotions, attitude and behaviour of enemy, neutral or friendly 
groups in support of current policy in time of war or emergency.’5  Yet psywar did not 
undergo a radical enlargement in the early Cold War.  This article asks how 
psychological warfare’s modest expansion can be accounted for in British strategy in 
the Middle East. 
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Since the end of the First World War the Middle East was a central locus for British 
power, and the government consistently aimed to preserve its interests in the region.6  
Between 1946 and 1955 oil consumption in the U.K. doubled; most came from the 
Middle East.7  Cold War theatre defence was allocated to Britain at American-British-
Canadian talks in October 1947.  Consequently military planning was conducted on a 
national, rather than allied, basis.8  Little is known about psywar in the area; most 
secret intelligence papers have been closed until recently.9  Newly released records 
belonging to the unit responsible for psychological warfare are examined here for the 
first time.  Created in 1951 to control strategic deception, from 1952 the Directorate 
of Forward Plans became involved in psywar planning.  After the Suez crisis the 
Directorate assumed overall responsibility for psychological warfare.10 
 
Existing work on early Cold War propaganda treats the military as largely irrelevant 
in a field dominated by the Foreign Office, and especially its Information Research 
Department (IRD), created in January 1948.  Much debate has centred upon the IRD’s 
position within overall Cold War strategy, whether the output it generated achieved 
anything, and whether the organisation should be understood primarily in Cold War 
or decolonisation terms. 11   Important questions have also been raised about the 
wisdom and ethics of directing propaganda at the British domestic audience.12  The 
Department is regarded as a ‘significant instrument of national and foreign policy.’13  
The leading book on propaganda in the decolonisation conflicts concentrates on how 
government shaped public opinion at home, rather than to support military 
operations.14  In single-country studies, the emphasis is upon colonial information 
services who often, as in Kenya, ran the show.15 
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Psychological warfare has been interpreted according to three organising ideas, 
relating to effectiveness, civil-military relations, and the conviction of its 
practitioners.  This article reinterprets these ideas to show how psychological warfare 
became gradually more important in regional defence in the Middle East.  Cyprus is 
included in the analysis as defence policy considered the island to be a major base for 
securing British interests in the region.  Cold War defence planning and colonial 
security are tackled together.  While political concessions, social reforms and 
propaganda are now thought to have mattered less in British counter-insurgency than 
violence, studies on counter-insurgency miss the long-term reasons why propaganda 
occupied a marginal position.16  These were to do with defence policy rather than 
colonial security.  This article thus makes a contribution to existing knowledge in 
three ways. 
 
Turning to effectiveness first, judging whether propaganda has an impact on the 
intended audience is a perennial difficulty.17  Research on the IRD often echoes the 
organisation’s own anxieties about their influence.18  James Vaughan persuasively 
argues propaganda aiming to generate popular enthusiasm for Britain’s Middle East 
presence was doomed in the decolonisation era.19  Yet for the military, swaying public 
opinion on a mass scale was not necessarily essential, nor even their prerogative.  
Targeting friendly elites, small numbers of rebels, or one’s own soldiers could be 
more appropriate.  The armed forces were less bothered about proving effectiveness 
conclusively because, unlike their diplomatic counterparts, they employed 
propaganda alongside other tactics.20  For the armed forces, the moment when an 
opponent began to counter propaganda directed at them indicated some effect was 
being felt.21   In Southeast Asia officials counted the publications distributed, the 
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column inches in newspapers based on their information, and how many insurgents 
surrendered.22  Doubts around effectiveness never decisively halted psywar’s cautious 
expansion in the Middle East in the early Cold War.  Military commanders never 
expected any tactic to be valuable in every given instance; this general rule applied to 
psywar too. 
 
A second tendency in the literature portrays psychological warfare as highly divisive, 
rousing a deep-seated animosity between civilians and soldiers over foreign and 
defence policy.  Discord has distracted from the prevalent compromise across the 
civil-military divide during the twentieth century, mundane as agreement might be 
when set aside sensational disputation.23  Writing on Cold War covert action, and 
propaganda in Northern Ireland, Rory Cormac has a keen eye for disagreement 
between military and civilians.24  On Britain’s turbulent experience in Egypt prior to 
the Suez crisis, Michael Thornhill perceives civil-military friction to be the norm.25  
These examples partly derive from over-specialisation in intelligence studies, military 
history and diplomatic history.  Strong demarcations are striking when the object of 
study is a single organisation, whether MI6, the British Army or the IRD.  Disputes 
about psywar happened within the armed forces, within and between Whitehall 
departments, and between officials in the Middle East and those in London.  Support 
for, and opposition to, psychological warfare transcended simple civil-military 
boundaries because these organisations permitted their staff to think for themselves. 
 
A third notion accuses those concerned with psychological warfare of zealotry.  
Richard Aldrich charges the Directorate of Forward Plans with exploiting the Malaya 
emergency to expand from deception work into territory rightly belonging to MI6 and 
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the IRD.26  Field Marshal Gerald Templer, High Commissioner in Malaya from 1952 
to 1954 and then Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) from 1955 to 1958, is 
identified as the mastermind behind the Directorate’s expansionism.  Templer's role in 
Malaya is claimed by Erik Linstrum to have ‘secured the status of psychological 
warfare in the British military for years to come.’27  He is chastised by Anthony Gorst 
and Keith Kyle for forcing psywar into the disastrous 1956 Suez invasion plans.28  
Behind these views lie misgivings about psychological warfare’s propensity to 
dangerously politicise the armed forces.29  If soldiers dispense propaganda, they might 
develop political ideas that cannot easily be controlled.  In the British military in the 
early Cold War Middle East the evidence points to ambivalence about psywar, not 
devotion, reflecting a long-running nervousness about propaganda in Britain’s 
political culture. 30   Major Ashworth, a leading expert, described psywar as ‘the 
weapon of the Cold War’, though admitting an ‘ugly and evil connotation’, 
reminiscent of Joseph Goebbels.31  Even the supposedly zealous psy-warriors were in 
two minds about the business. 
 
The article argues psychological warfare expanded gradually in British military plans 
and operations because the attractions of a cheap victory were counter-balanced by 
reservations about whether the method worked, and risked politicising the armed 
forces.  The argument is structured in the following sections.  The first section 
analyses how planning developed.  The Chiefs of Staff abstained from inserting 
propaganda into their war plans until April 1952, only doing so systematically from 
February 1957 because changes required civil-military consensus.  The Korean War 
and, above all the Suez crisis, hastened an extension in psychological warfare 
planning, capabilities and deployment.  Augmentation came due to shifts in the 
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strategic environment (such as Egyptian and Soviet propaganda) and in defence 
policy.  The article thus contributes to the critique of decline as the primary leitmotif 
in post-war defence by arguing policy-makers wanted methods to sustain British 
interests after the Suez crisis.32  When the 1957 Sandys Review reorganised defence, 
psychological warfare betokened a cheap alternative to conscription.  The second 
section considers operations in Oman.  Even as psywar failed to deliver clear results 
against rebels in Oman, regional commanders applauded the tactic’s value in 
countering Egyptian propaganda in an unobtrusive way at a politically sensitive 
moment.  With other tactics available, and psywar so cheap, effectiveness was not 
everything.  The third section deals with Aden, where impact was judged in another 
sense; here, psywar reinforced allies, central to shoring-up Britain’s precarious 
regional position.  The military and colonial authorities agreed on the requirement to 
counter Egyptian and Soviet output: psywar was cheap and easier to arrange than 
other options.  In the fourth section, light is thrown on the Cyprus emergency, where a 
dispute arose over when to undertake propaganda; was a political solution to the 
conflict a prerequisite?  The military unit in charge of psywar attempted to breach the 
rule that the Foreign Office or Colonial Office held supremacy over propaganda, in a 
frantic bid to counter allegations about the security forces’ brutality.  Desperately re-
defining the protection of military morale as the yardstick for judging psychological 
warfare temporarily broke the civil-military consensus.  Though causing political 
headaches, these pressures from below for defensive propaganda were to return in 
Aden in the 1960s and Northern Ireland in the 1970s. 
 
Planning for psychological warfare in the Middle East 
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Between 1945 and 1960 psychological warfare’s importance in planning for conflict 
in the Middle East expanded, linked to debates about global strategy, and with broad 
civil-military agreement despite occasional friction.  Preparations for a possible 
confrontation with the Soviet Union began during the Second World War.33  In May 
1946 the Foreign Office’s Russia Committee concluded the Soviets intended to 
expand into the free world.34  Defence policy ranked the Middle East as the third 
priority in war, after protecting the United Kingdom, and the sea lines of 
communication.  The 1948 regional plan hoped a joint air offensive with the 
Americans would strike the Red Army and targets in the USSR.  Even the planners 
accepted it contained flaws: a reliance on American aeroplanes, the inability to defend 
Suez against Soviet air assault, and assumed co-operation from Arab states.35  In 
contending with global overstretch, the Chiefs of Staff asked the Foreign Office to 
accept a political warfare plan, including special operations and deception.  What they 
really wanted was a permanent Political Warfare Executive (PWE).36  Prime Minister 
Attlee put the military in their place in December 1949, creating the Ministerial 
Committee on Communism (Overseas), and a subordinate Official Committee.  These 
committees solidified the Foreign Secretary's control over political warfare.37 
 
Psychological warfare came within the purview of a body originally intended to focus 
upon strategic deception.  Britain’s sophisticated deception operations during the 
Second World War, such as those surrounding the D-Day landings in 1944, are well 
known.38  The wartime London Controlling Section, responsible for co-ordinating 
deception, survived into peacetime only in an etiolated form – three officers were 
retained to write historical accounts of the organisation’s activities.  The Section was 
revived in 1946 after both Henry Tizard’s report on future war for the Cabinet 
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Defence Committee, and the Secret Intelligence Service, pressed for the use of 
deception in the Cold War.  Huw Dylan points to the new terms of reference issued to 
the Section in December 1947 as marking its re-activation.39  However, a letter from 
Wing Commander P.H.R Saunders, dated 12 December 1946, notes the London 
Controlling Section ‘has just been re-constituted.’ 40   The next year an 
interdepartmental committee was set up under Major-General Sir Leslie Hollis to 
oversee the Section.  The Hollis Committee met for the last time in December 1949; 
in May 1950 John Drew, an experienced deception planner, took over the London 
Controlling Section, reporting now to the Chief Staff Officer to the Minister of 
Defence.  In February 1951 the Section was re-named the Directorate of Forward 
Plans.41  By June the Directorate comprised Drew as Director, retired Colonel H.N.H. 
Wild as his deputy, and a staff officer from each of the services.  In addition there 
were sections in the Far East and the Middle East, the former comprising three 
officers, and the latter only one.42  Besides deception, by May 1966 the Directorate 
was involved in counter-subversion, psychological warfare, and schemes to improve 
military relations with local communities.43 
 
Erik Linstrum argues the Malaya insurgency ‘served as a critical early test’ for 
psywar; success there ‘bolstered the rationale for a massive propaganda machine.’44  
Propaganda has been credited with ending the conflict, and the strategy there elevated 
as a model in counter-insurgency.45  Yet Malaya made hardly any impact on wider 
psywar planning.  Although officers at the Army Staff College in the 1950s studied 
Malaya, time was also spent examining the Second World War, Korea and Kenya.46  
The Korean War in fact prompted a policy change, in line with a huge rise in defence 
spending.  Britain's deception capabilities were reinvigorated in the Directorate of 
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Forward Plans.47  Leading figures in the Directorate likely felt immune to pressures to 
conform to mainstream military culture.  Director John Drew was a civil servant with 
experience in Customs and Excise and the Cabinet Office.48  Group Captain Philip 
Magrath, Chief Intelligence Officer in Coastal Command during the war, came out of 
retirement to be the officer responsible for the Middle East.49  On returning to London 
to oversee all psychological warfare, he was replaced by Colonel George Davy, who 
was recommissioned after retiring in 1948. 50   Psychological warfare was too 
controversial for promising young officers to risk blotting their copybook. 
 
Responding to increased Soviet propaganda in the Middle East, Chief of the Air Staff 
John Slessor called for a review in April 1951.51  The Chiefs agreed in March 1952 to 
establish an Interdepartmental Working Party on Psychological Warfare.52  Further 
progress only came thanks to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden approving a key paper 
on 23 April 1952.  In a global war, a PWE would appear on the Second World War 
model, reporting to the Foreign Secretary.53  But this was only during a war against 
the USSR.  A major strategic review conducted by the Chiefs later in the year 
established what to do in lower-level conflicts.  The Global Strategy Paper expected 
nuclear deterrence to render all-out war with the Soviet Union improbable; more 
unconventional challenges outside Europe were anticipated.54  In the Middle East, a 
new ‘forward strategy’ allocated a single division to defend the theatre, with only one 
brigade group permanently based there.  Such optimism relied on airpower, 
commando raids and demolitions to slow a Soviet advance, plus assistance from 
regional allies.55  Threat assessments and theatre plans now foresaw problems which 
irregular methods, such as psywar, could address.  Thus in March 1953 the Defence 
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Co-ordination Committees in the Middle East, Far East and Germany were directed to 
plan for psywar in wartime, including under nuclear conditions: 
 
...a future war will be of unparalleled intensity.  This will include the 
widespread atomic attack of targets in Russia.  It is considered that the Soviet 
Government will do all in their power to prevent the results of the allied 
strategic air offensive becoming known by their armies in the field, since such 
knowledge might decisively weaken their will to fight.  Enemy troops can 
only be informed of the allied air effort by psychological warfare measures.56 
 
The Chiefs’ burgeoning enthusiasm for psywar only made headway because the 
Foreign Office were thinking along similar lines.  Two key reports written for the 
Foreign Office on propaganda and the overseas information services advocated 
investment in information services and a more assertive campaign against the 
Communist powers.57   However, the shared passion for propaganda between the 
Foreign Office and the Chiefs was not universally appreciated.  The Middle East 
commanders hesitated, taking over five months to respond to the call for plans.  They 
argued the instructions made no sense.  During war there were unlikely to be large 
concentrations of enemy troops against whom propaganda could be directed.  Even if 
they could be reached, Soviet soldiers served in an ‘indoctrinated army not readily 
susceptible to enemy propaganda.’58  These reservations blocked regional planning 
for the time being.  The Interdepartmental Working Party set up in March 1952 hardly 
exuded zeal either, only reporting in November 1954, but reaching the opposite 
conclusion to the Middle East commanders.  Fear of nuclear attack made dispersing 
military forces essential: a spread-out enemy could be attacked with psywar and 
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guerrilla tactics.  The Working Party advised that the Army take the lead on 
psychological warfare, and aim to develop training and doctrine.  Planners needed to 
address ‘local military operations’, as was happening on an ad hoc basis in Malaya 
and Kenya. 59   The Foreign Office agreed, and yet again progress in planning 
happened when the Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff agreed on the need for 
enhanced psywar capabilities.60 
 
As tensions with Egypt ramped up over Britain's right to base troops in the Suez canal 
zone, and in accord with the Global Strategy Paper’s attention to subversion, on 3 
May 1956 the IRD’s charter was amended to include anti-subversion.61  Low-level 
propaganda within Egypt had in fact been going on since 1951.62  An inquiry chaired 
by Douglas Dodds-Parker, a junior Foreign Office minister, recommended spending 
an extra £568,000 annually on broadcasting in the region, plus building new facilities 
in Aden, Libya, Cyprus and the Persian Gulf.63  With a strong consensus forming 
between the Chiefs and the Foreign Office, the Defence Co-ordination Committee 
(Middle East) finally gave in and set up a Psychological Warfare Committee, though 
it only met in January 1957.64  The Service ministries also resisted expanding psywar, 
to an extent as a battle in their wider war against the encroaching powers of the 
Ministry of Defence, a war they finally lost in 1963. 65   In July 1956 all three 
ministries vetoed a proposal by the Directorate of Forward Plans to create a 
permanent psychological warfare unit, citing financial constraints.66  In practice these 
would have been miniscule.  At least the training authorised in late 1954 began in 
September 1956.  Students were ‘initially somewhat sceptical’ about the topic.67  One 
air force and twelve army officers graduated from the course as psychological warfare 
staff officers; a course ran every year subsequently.68 
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By the time the Suez crisis struck in October 1956, only limited progress had been 
achieved in embedding psychological warfare into defence planning.  Propaganda was 
an important part of the government’s bid to achieve domestic support for the 
intervention, and resulted in a serious conflict between ministers and the BBC over 
the content of their news coverage. 69   John Rennie, Director of the Information 
Research Department, was appointed in August 1956 to head a new Information 
Coordination Executive (ICE), tasked with overseeing propaganda during the crisis.70  
In the planning stages, staff from the Directorate of Forward Plans plus small teams 
from the Royal Signals and the Royal Air Force were assigned to implement ICE 
directives.  They hoped to sow dissension between the Egyptian army and air force, to 
undermine public support for Nasser’s regime, and to encourage civilians to move 
away from the battle zone.71  The plan envisaged delivering these messages by radio 
broadcasts, loudspeaker vans and a million leaflets, dropped from the air. 72  
Ultimately little was accomplished, not least because the man appointed as Director of 
Psychological Warfare, Brigadier Bernard Fergusson, lacked any prior experience in 
the field.73  General Sir Charles Keightley, who commanded allied forces at Suez, 
lamented that “we never got going with our psychological warfare at all.”74 
 
Obstacles planted by the Service ministries and theatre commanders were eroded by 
the crisis, for two reasons.  Firstly, far from heralding the dumping of great power 
ambitions, policy-makers conserved a determination to wield power in the Middle 
East after Suez.75  Secondly, the Sandys Review in 1957 restructured defence policy 
towards an expeditionary posture.  In the years after Suez several interventions were 
mounted to protect British interests.76  Concerns about Egyptian expansionism in the 
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region lingered until the final withdrawal from Aden in 1967.77  After Suez the IRD’s 
‘counter-Nasserite work’ expanded.78  Rather than empire-building, the Directorate’s 
moves to expand psywar should be seen as connected to these changes in defence and 
foreign policy.  Suez taught ‘a hastily constructed odd lot, however personally 
talented, is not a good idea.’79  The IRD agreed on ‘the need for a coherent policy 
with some appeal to the target audience,’ better intelligence on the audience and 
language expertise, plus more equipment and training.80 
 
The Chiefs of Staff now ranked propaganda ‘an integral part of our defence effort’.  
At last the Middle East commanders agreed, hoping propaganda could partially offset 
pending manpower reductions in the military.81  The April 1957 review by Minister of 
Defence Duncan Sandys marked a radical change, ending national service, reducing 
the armed forces by 300,000 personnel, and giving an elevated role to nuclear 
deterrence.82  As Colonel Davy, the Directorate’s senior officer in the Middle East, 
wrote: ‘the run-down of the shooting soldiers must be made up for by setting up P.W. 
resources.’83   Psywar assets matched up with the perceived threat.  The Foreign 
Office’s Regional Information Officer saw Egyptian radio as ‘our biggest worry,’ a 
‘first-class’ propaganda weapon which outclassed the British.84  Finally jolted into 
action, the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (Middle East) examined all plans 
to see if psywar measures might be inserted. 85   They asked for additional radio 
stations in Bahrain, Somaliland and Malta, plus jamming equipment, printing presses, 
loud hailers, and further personnel.86  For the men in the Middle East who had to deal 
with Egyptian broadcasts, the necessity for striking back seemed obvious.  General 
Bourne, in London after commanding the Middle East Land Forces (MELF), 
commented at a Royal United Services Institute event: ‘We are engaged in a 
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psychological and political war, and I do not believe that the Middle East will be won 
or lost by firing a shot, but by psychological warfare.’87 
 
Opposition to psywar’s broadening remit came from civilian and military quarters.  
Patrick Dean, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, was extremely 
suspicious of the Chiefs interfering in propaganda.88  IRD head John Rennie wanted 
to maintain Foreign Office control, giving the military ‘constant political guidance’.89  
Nothing could be calculated to irritate a military commander more.  At an August 
1957 Working Party meeting, the Admiralty opposed setting up a permanent unit.  
The War Office disagreed, asserting ‘definite Service requirements for Psychological 
Warfare’, a call repeated by Vice-CIGS General Stratton five months later.90  On 21 
October the new Army representative on the Working Party conspired with Hugh 
Cortazzi from the IRD to block John Drew's ‘empire-building ambitions.’  Major 
Cowan objected to the Directorate of Forward Plans’ expansion betokening a power-
grab by the Ministry of Defence.91  The Colonial Office worried about psy-warriors 
meddling in their territories, and making matters worse.  They believed ‘the whole 
philosophy of psychological warfare is inappropriate’, as the population should ‘not 
be regarded as hostile targets’, even during rebellions.92  They forgot the hundreds of 
surrendered insurgents subjected to psywar in Malaya and Kenya. 
 
Compromises were reached.  To placate the Colonial Office, the Services stopped 
calling the population the ‘enemy’, and later adopted the more anodyne American 
term ‘psychological operations’.93  The Working Party accepted Foreign Office or 
Colonial Office supremacy over propaganda, but urged immediate action in Cyprus, 
Aden and the Persian Gulf.94  The Chiefs of Staff endorsed these conclusions; while 
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Field Marshal Templer abandoned his drive for a permanent PWE, to satisfy the 
Foreign Office.95  In July 1958 Air Vice-Marshal Heath, commanding British Forces 
in the Arabian Peninsula, asked London for a permanent psychological warfare unit, 
in addition to the unit loaned to him by MELF.96  The War Office refused.97  This was 
despite the approval of the Vice-CIGS for such a unit only six months earlier.  From 
around January 1959 the training school at Maresfield did provide a small cadre unit 
for deployment overseas at short notice.98  Progress was uneven: the Directors of 
Plans in London declined an appeal by the Directorate of Forward Plans to include 
psywar in all planning documents. 99   By April 1961 Major Shackleton, the 
psychological warfare officer at British Forces Arabian Peninsula headquarters, 
lamented ‘very few officers in the Army ever have to think about “P ops”’. 100  
Though the ultimate goal for psywar enthusiasts – a permanent Political Warfare 
Executive to direct aggressive Cold War propaganda – never transpired, psywar now 
resided in military planning and several deployable teams.  This expanded role arose 
because the Chiefs and the Foreign Office agreed on a strategic requirement to project 
psychological warfare in the Middle East after Suez. 
 
Psychological warfare in Oman, 1957-1959 
 
How did psywar perform in practice?  Precisely because psychological warfare was 
supposed to be combined with other tactics, such as air strikes, small-unit patrols or 
political concessions, judging psywar’s contribution to the final outcome was 
problematic.  Operations in Muscat and Oman in 1957-59 illustrate the conundrum.  
British policy-makers wanted to extend their interests in the country, with minimum 
publicity in the aftermath of Suez.  After the ruling Imam’s death in May 1954, Sultan 
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Sa’id bin Taymur, based in Muscat, aimed to unify the country, contrary to a 
convention granting the interior autonomy.  The Sultan was encouraged by the 
British, to facilitate oil exploration and secure the region against Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt.101  The new Imam, Ghalib bin Ali, and his brother Talib bin Ali, fled to Egypt 
in December 1955.  Anti-Muscat and anti-British propaganda emanating from Egypt 
duly increased throughout 1956.102  On 14 June 1957 Talib led the Omani Liberation 
Army into the Sultanate.103  They quickly captured Nizwa and called on all tribes to 
establish an Imamate, a call heeded only by the Bani Hina and Beni Riyam tribes.104  
In mid-July the Sultan appealed to Britain for assistance.  The Chiefs of Staff 
authorised the bombing of rebel forts and the deployment of 1st Cameronians and the 
Trucial Oman Scouts, later to be joined by 15/19th Hussars.  An offensive in August 
pushed the Imam's men out of Nizwa, and onto the Jebel al-Akhdar, a mountain range 
spanning 180 by 60 miles.  All attempts to dislodge the rebels over the following 
months failed.105 
 
At this point the British government set upon psywar as an alternative to deploying 
troops in large numbers, which was bound to attract criticism in the tense post-Suez 
climate.106  In November 1957 Colonel Davy created a team at Nizwa to encourage 
the Beni Riyam tribe to reconcile with the Sultan, using leaflets, voice aircraft, films 
and posters.107  Within a month the team’s commander, Major Isaac, had won over 
Bernard Burrows, the British Resident in Bahrain.108  Whatever transpired in London, 
diplomatic support in the country concerned was essential for psywar to proceed.  Yet 
Isaac encountered opposition from local military commanders, who confessed to 
‘feeling that psy-war was a poor substitute for going up the hill and into battle.’109  
These sentiments were dismissed as conventional attacks, such as that mounted in 
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mid-November by 13/18th Hussars, the Royal Air Force (RAF), the Trucial Oman 
Scouts and the Muscat Armed Forces, failed to quash the rebellion.110  Persuading the 
Sultan to combine psywar with political measures proved a delicate business.  
Eventually he agreed to refrain from executing those who surrendered.  Major Isaac 
proposed his seven-man team aim to undermine belief in the Imam's cause and Talib's 
leadership, induce ‘malingering, desertion, mutiny, flight or surrender among the 
rebels’, and deny them support from other tribes.111  Meanwhile, the Muscat Armed 
Forces carried out reprisals, demolishing houses, cutting down date palms, 
confiscating property and imposing fines.112 
 
Views on psywar’s effectiveness fluctuated.  Both propaganda and the other measures 
failed to halt extensive landmine-laying by the rebels.113  By late February 1958 local 
political sentiment had hardened, with an adviser arguing the ‘Arab recognises 
nothing but force and money.’114  But MELF described Isaac's work as ‘the most 
important element and other military action is being tailored at all stages to fit in with 
psychological plan.’115  Cognisant of the scepticism about psywar back home, Colonel 
Davy warned that if the operation faltered, ‘we should be prepared for some of our 
enemies to say “psychological warfare is no good; we told you so.”’116  The Ministry 
of Defence was optimistic enough to send an interrogator for obtaining propaganda-
worthy information from prisoners.117  Visiting Oman in March, Davy realised that 
both the authorities in Muscat and British Army officers favoured psywar.118  Isaac 
demurred: the blockade around the Jebel leaked, offensive patrols up to the mountain 
seldom happened, artillery bombardments achieved nothing, and the Sultan blocked 
any serious incentives for surrender.  Matters improved by late August, when 
energetic patrols by the Muscat Armed Forces were finally mounted and air strikes 
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appeared to damage rebel morale.119  Psywar operations were stepped up for a short 
period in September.  Bombing was suspended in November after the rebels put out 
peace feelers; talks collapsed when the Sultan refused to compromise.  Air-dropped 
leaflets, giving the rebels until 22 November to surrender before bombing resumed, 
produced nothing.120 
 
Colonel David Smiley, Commander of the Sultan’s Armed Forces since April 1958, 
had little patience for psywar.  He mocked how: ‘This “voice” aircraft was fitted with 
a loud-speaker through which we broadcast messages and propaganda to the rebels; 
after one of its flights they sent a message down to us complaining that the loud-
speaker was faulty and they couldn't hear.’121  Smiley requested the Army despatch 
reinforcements to take the Jebel.  In late October London settled on sending 22nd 
Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) after lobbying by the Commanding Officer, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Deane-Drummond.122  The SAS faced possible abolition under 
the Sandys Defence Review; Deane-Drummond jumped on the opportunity to prove 
the Regiment’s relevance.123  A dramatic assault on the Jebel in late January 1959, 
with the SAS in the lead, dislodged the rebels and sent the Imam and Talib fleeing 
into Saudi Arabia.124  Major Isaac cantankerously asserted the battle was won before 
the SAS assault.125  Peter de la Billière, then a junior SAS officer, recalled that during 
patrols before the final assault, rebels stood in the open and waved at his troopers.126  
This was hardly the behaviour of those on the verge of defeat. 
 
Yet operations in Oman convinced regional commanders of the utility of 
psychological warfare.  Air Vice-Marshal Heath concluded that despite the limitations 
imposed by the Sultan, psywar proved ‘a useful complimentary influence on the local 
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population to that produced by the normal ground/air operations.’127  These claims to 
London were rather two-faced: on returning to Aden, Major Isaac found his office, 
desk and clerk had all disappeared from the headquarters.128   The Jebel Akhdar 
campaign of 1957-59 shows psychological warfare's status in military thinking as a 
potentially useful tactic when other options were limited.  Psywar could be deployed 
easily, was cheap and avoided the need for large troop numbers.  This fitted into the 
general preference in defence policy for cheaper alternatives to massive conventional 
forces after the 1957 Sandys review.129  Even when high enemy combat motivation 
and limited backing from a key local ally constrained what psywar could achieve, its 
value was too indeterminate to be easily dismissed. 
 
Psychological warfare in Aden, 1957-1961 
 
Besides being aimed at an opponent, propaganda could be directed at allies.  This was 
significant for regional strategy because Britain’s weak conventional forces needed 
allies to deter the Soviet Union.130  Moreover, colonial counter-insurgency relied upon 
local allies to supply the manpower for expanding the security forces.131  Military ties 
with armed forces in the Middle East were mirrored by extensive IRD contacts with 
broadcasters, journalists and opinion formers.132  IRD material was also distributed 
via the Baghdad Pact’s Counter-Subversion Committee, formed in 1956.133  Psywar 
aligned with civilian information policy to uphold British interests in the Middle East.  
Aden is an illuminating example for understanding a growing reliance on propaganda 
to counter anti-colonial pressures from rivals such as the USSR, Egypt, Saudi Arabia 
and the Yemen.  As Spencer Mawby argues, British information policy in Aden 
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aimed to re-direct ‘resentment against external interference away from London and 
towards Cairo.’134 
 
The British believed that subversive influences entered the Aden Protectorates from 
neighbouring Yemen.  The trouble was really of Britain's own making, starting in the 
early 1950s when the colonial authorities pursued a ‘forward policy’, pushing their 
reach into the autonomous East and West Aden Protectorates. 135   Trying to 
incorporate tribes into a federation in the later 1950s provoked revolts, at times 
backed by the Yemen, concerned about a strong rival on her border.136  Offensive 
covert operations into the Yemen between 1955 and 1964 aimed to destabilise the 
Imam’s regime and deter interference in the Protectorates. 137   By July 1957 the 
Defence Co-ordination Committee also blamed Russian propaganda for pursuing a 
‘war of nerves’ in Aden and the Protectorates.  The Middle East commanders, eager 
to avoid a regional arms race, advocated ‘urgent and effective psychological warfare.’  
A firepower demonstration for ‘local notables’, including 106 mm recoilless rifles (an 
anti-tank weapon) and aircraft firing rockets, would prove British resolve.  Radio 
broadcasts and mobile loudspeaker units could then spread a pro-British message in 
remote areas.  Yet the Middle East commanders hedged their bets, moving anti-tank 
mines and warplanes to Aden in case propaganda proved insufficient.138   
 
Governor Sir William Luce believed the military threat to the Protectorates to be 
‘slight’, but local nerves to be fragile.  For Luce the Arabs maintained a ‘constant 
preoccupation ...with the apparent strength of the traditional enemy.’  Rumours about 
the Yemen moving tanks and heavy guns to the border were accepted at face value.  
Local rulers, such as the Sharif of Beihan and the Audhali Sultan, wanted to see 
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British strength to shore up morale in their tribes.  These rulers were essential in 
Britain's plans for making a federation in South Arabia, co-opting the local elites to 
suppress any rebellion and ensure continued access to the military base in Aden.  
Luce asked for tanks to address these concerns: they would do more than mere words.  
Maintaining tribal morale was essential.139 
 
For once the Directorate of Forward Plans and the Colonial Office agreed, backing 
Luce’s request to the Chiefs of Staff a few days later.  Templer suggested a psywar 
expert go to serve on the staff at British Forces Arabian Peninsula.140  The other 
Chiefs acceded, also accepting that visual evidence was desirable.  But the only 
available tanks, Centurions, tended to break down a lot, which was unlikely to 
improve Britain's image.  Instead the Chiefs despatched voice truck equipment, a 
voice aircraft, and ten 106 mm recoilless rifles.141  Great store was set in the power of 
film, with six cinemas in Aden city, one mobile cinema in action and four more 
mobile units on the way.  Colonel Davy believed cinema appealed because ‘most of 
the population have nothing to do.’  Local authorities asked for the Gaumont Arabic 
News Service and films ‘showing displays’, like trooping the colour, or Charlie 
Chaplins.142  Backed by the First Sea Lord, John Drew persuaded the Central Office 
of Information to make a film showing British soldiers ‘in friendly contact with the 
local population’ and helping out after a natural disaster.  A disjointed narrative arc 
then cut to a battle where British soldiers and aeroplanes destroyed tanks.  Colonial 
Office experts in London expected the plot to ‘go over big with Arab audiences.’143  
However, the authorities in Aden dismissed the film as likely to damage local morale.  
Given the bureaucratic effort involved, Drew was ‘much perturbed by this volte face’, 
so pressed Colonel Davy to try and change attitudes.144  He partially succeeded: by 
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early January 1958 the film, ‘All in a Day's Work’, was being shown to the Aden 
Protectorate Levies.  But it was deemed too frightening for the public, ‘...who have 
never seen a tank.  They are not thinking about the Russian tanks in the Yemen at 
present and the political people think it is best not to remind them.’145  The episode 
illustrated divergent opinions between the Colonial Office in London and local 
administrators about likely audience reception, and the need to produce material 
quickly before the context changed. 
 
As the colonial authorities incorporated the Protectorate states into a federation, a 
leading opponent to the scheme, Sultan Ali, was deposed after British troops invaded 
the Sultanate of Lahej (just west of Aden) in April 1958.  His successor, Fadhl, 
predictably joined the federation.146  By July 1958 Major Isaac had convinced the 
Commander of British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula to use psywar in Aden as well 
as Oman.  In Air Vice-Marshal Heath's view, the conventional offensive in Lahej 
could have benefitted from psywar.  Therefore he requested a psychological warfare 
unit be permanently attached to his command.147  Heath wrote directly to the Chief of 
the Defence Staff a month later to reinforce his point.  Britain's military position in 
the Middle East was being weakened by Egyptian and Russian radio propaganda, 
which reached a large audience.  The best response was to boost British broadcasting 
in the region.  This meant erecting a radio relay station at Berbera, across the Gulf of 
Aden in Somaliland, re-opening the station in Cyprus and financial and technical 
support to the transmissions from Aden, Bahrain and Amman.  More than a year's 
military operations against rebels in Oman and South Arabia had produced ‘no 
possible constructive effect.’  Heath argued, ‘...in the long term words are cheaper 
than bullets, have a greater range, and are more acceptable to the recipients.’148  The 
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Chiefs took seven months to decide how to respond, sending a psychological warfare 
officer, a unit for him to command, and a broadcasting aircraft.149  The officer trained 
two Aden government teams to run Land Rovers fitted with film and public address 
equipment.150  The threat from the Yemen receded in November 1959 when the Imam 
invited Governor Luce to talks in Taiz, stabilising the border question until the 
revolution in Yemen in 1962.151  Events in Aden saw the military expanding their 
propaganda work into areas normally reserved for the colonial authorities.  Inter-
departmental tussles in Whitehall were forgotten because civilians and soldiers alike 
perceived a growing danger from Egypt and the Yemen.  Psywar units were amongst 
the few resources available to strengthen the resolve of local allies. 
 
Psychological warfare in Cyprus, 1957-1959 
 
In Cyprus the Colonial and Foreign Offices exerted tighter control for much longer 
before letting the Directorate of Forward Plans enter the scene.  The insurgency on 
Cyprus attracted intense international controversy, and propaganda occupied a central 
place in the strategy pursued by EOKA (the National Organisation of Cypriot 
Fighters).152   Violence began to unfold from April 1955 because Greek Cypriots 
wanted enosis (union) with Greece.  After four years of fighting the British granted 
independence whilst retaining basing rights on the island.153  Up to the present time 
Cyprus retains a central place in British policy towards the Middle East, not least as a 
global hub in the Anglo-American signals intelligence enterprise.154  The controversy 
about psychological warfare concerned the conditions under which success could be 
achieved: was progress only possible once a diplomatic solution to the crisis came 
into focus, or should tactical operations be pursued immediately to deny the initiative 
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to the enemy?  Foreign Office expert John Reddaway visited Cyprus in summer 1955 
at the behest of the Governor and the CIGS, concluding the absence of a credible 
political offer to the Greek Cypriots nullified the potential for propaganda.155  His 
assessment encapsulated the London Foreign Office perspective on propaganda 
throughout the campaign.  In July Leslie Glass, Head of the Information Division at 
the British Middle East Office (a Foreign Office establishment) formed the opposite 
view.  He suggested a director for propaganda be appointed to co-ordinate operations 
on the island, liaising with information officers in London, Athens and Ankara on 
shaping international opinion.156  On his appointment to the directorship in November 
Glass oversaw ‘a very heavy stream of propaganda’ targeting the local population.157  
He remained until early 1957, leaving without a successor.158  Glass' expertise and 
Foreign Office background explain the military's exclusion from propaganda up until 
then. 
 
Colonel Davy tried to insert the Directorate of Forward Plans into Cyprus in August 
1957, sensing an opportunity with Glass absent and a lull in civilian propaganda.  As 
Deputy Director of Forward Plans (Middle East), Davy was physically located in the 
Middle East Land Forces headquarters in Cyprus.  The Defence Coordination 
Committee authorised his running a training course at Episkopi for junior officers 
from across the Middle East.  Davy invited the Cyprus authorities to send an expert to 
lecture the students.159  This move to build psywar capacity gave the Directorate an 
excuse to inveigle themselves into the campaign.  Despite Davy’s courting, the 
colonial officials held off on further collaboration.  A shift in the political climate 
prompted a second try.  In May 1958 Colonel Davy persuaded Brigadier Gleadell, 
Chief of Staff to the Director of Operations, to draw on the Directorate's resources.160  
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The Commander-in-Chief at MELF, Lieutenant General Sir Roger Bower, weighed in 
with Governor Sir Hugh Foot.161  Gleadell and Bower knew psywar from Malaya, and 
the trailblazer there, Templer, supported psywar being implanted in Cyprus from his 
position as CIGS.162  Bower and Foot previously intended to postpone psywar until 
London devised a political initiative worth selling.  Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
announced such a plan on 19 June, giving shared control to the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots, with British withdrawal to the base areas.  Knowing this was in the pipeline, 
Bower urged Foot to jump on the ‘opportune moment for a vigorous psychological 
approach.’163  Another incentive was a resurgence in atrocity allegations about the 
security forces, attracting criticism from Parliament, the European Court of Human 
Rights and the United Nations.164  These allegations started to appear in April 1956 
and the government tried to present them as fabrications to be expected in any 
terrorist campaign.165  Foot therefore accepted Bower's ‘very welcome’ proposal for 
help.166 
 
This represented a serious victory for Colonel Davy and the Directorate of Forward 
Plans.  A few months earlier, the Colonial Office had resisted any psychological 
warfare in their territories, psywar in Oman was failing and the tactic's future seemed 
in doubt.  Rumours even reached Davy in April 1958 that his position faced abolition.  
An urgent need for vindication can be sensed in Davy's appreciations from the time.  
He found defeatism permeated civil and military personnel in Nicosia, yet believed in 
his own ability to overturn it by showing most Greek Cypriots ‘do not hate the 
British, but they have been intimidated by EOKA.’167  Though intimidation happened, 
blindness to a rebellion's popularity is common in counter-insurgents, who must 
otherwise admit their own futility.  Psy-warriors always held the audience to be 
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convertible.  The Directorate certainly attempted to exploit an opportunity by 
injecting an optimistic reading of the potential for psywar.  They only succeeded 
because officials in Cyprus wanted to buy what they were selling.  Besides Bower and 
Gleadell, at least six District Security Committees favoured psychological 
operations. 168   The military gave increasing support: in October, the Director of 
Operations appointed a General Staff Officer Grade II (Psychological Support), to 
serve in the Secretariat.169  In November the Middle East commanders created the 
Psychological Support Team Middle East.170  The Air Ministry sent a Pembroke voice 
aircraft and crew - two years after the Directorate suggested them.171  Davy's attempt 
to consolidate the Directorate's position in the Middle East had succeeded at last. 
 
Having won the argument, Colonel Davy, Squadron Leader Derry (his staff officer) 
and Edward Wynne, previously a deputy to Leslie Glass, co-ordinated two units from 
June 1958 to rejuvenate propaganda: the Information Research Unit and the Special 
Investigation Group.  The Information Research Unit (IRU), reconstituted from the 
Glass era, planned and conducted operations.  Its main products were leaflets 
appealing for peace, apologetic leaflets for distribution at road blocks and house 
searches, leaflets condemning terrorism, and tapes to be broadcast during curfews and 
searches.  Their quality was diminished by the Unit's limited access to policy 
documents and intelligence reports. 172   The Special Investigations Group (SIG) 
existed to counter abuse allegations about British troops.  It was a first in post-war 
British counter-insurgency.  Unlike Malaya or Kenya, mistreatment of civilians 
happened in full view in towns and villages, readily accessible to journalists.173 
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The SIG rapidly investigated incidents, issued a statement to disprove false 
allegations, and gathered evidence where offences had been committed.  191 incidents 
were dealt with during its nine month lifetime.  David French argues the Group ‘did 
not exist to apply whitewash to the misdemeanours of the security forces.’  However, 
he also describes how evidence collected by the Group was used to cover up a 
vengeful rampage by soldiers in October 1958, injuring 255 people and killing 
three.174  Brian Drohan quotes the Deputy Governor's desire to make the SIG ‘an 
important unit in our campaign to defeat EOKA.’  For Drohan the Group existed 
primarily for counter-propaganda purposes.  They uncovered some bogus allegations, 
in one case catching someone re-arranging furniture ready to blame soldiers for 
trashing their house.  Drohan stresses the SIG purpose in stopping the counter-
insurgency campaign being derailed by investigations into misconduct. 175   Maria 
Hadjiathanasiou views the SIG’s main purpose to have been protecting Britain’s 
reputation on the international stage.176 
 
These accounts miss the main reason for the Group's creation and the Directorate of 
Forward Plans' entrance into the Cyprus Emergency: a sense that soldiers were being 
let down by the civilian leadership.  Unlike Oman and Aden, in Cyprus enemy 
propaganda was undermining not only the confidence of the local population in 
British strategy, but also that of the soldiers themselves.  The Group described its 
‘ultimate and overriding aim - the prevention of allegations against the Security 
Forces and, in any case, to buttress their morale.’177  In February 1957, before the SIG 
came into existence, officials in Paphos and Limassol reported Greek opinion 
normally accepted allegations against the security forces as truthful. 178   Psywar 
techniques from Malaya and Kenya were known to have little effect, yet were still 
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persisted with.179  This can only be understood by accepting the psywar campaign 
launched in June 1958 was intended to placate soldiers impatient to see action being 
taken against the abuse hurled at them.  Whether the counter-measures worked was a 
secondary consideration.  This was a significant departure because the conventional 
wisdom, in both the Foreign Office and the Army, stipulated that propaganda should 
not be directed at British troops.  Morale was, rather, a responsibility for regimental 
officers, the Education Corps and padres. 180   IRD Director Ralph Murray stated 
‘Home morale is not a psychological warfare responsibility.  Nor is troops' morale.’181  
While the colonial government on Cyprus followed Murray's rule, the Middle East 
military commanders dissented.  They aimed ‘to foster the prestige and morale of 
British Armed Forces throughout the theatre and to devise plans to forestall and to 
counter anti-British and subversive propaganda directed against them.’182  The June 
1958 change in course should be interpreted as the Middle East commanders acting to 
correct the Colonial Office's refusal to protect their soldiers from vilification. 
 
Having approved psywar in May, Governor Foot now tried to obstruct these 
developments.  He questioned whether the political circumstances were ripe for 
intensive propaganda, criticising the psywar experts who ‘have not been able to give 
us much practical assistance in our unique circumstances.’183  The Colonial Secretary 
proposed Leslie Glass return to advise on how to proceed.  Foot accepted the offer, 
yet doubted the prospects for success.184  Resistance came from military quarters too: 
Colonel Davy lamented his failure to get leading figures on the Director of 
Operations' staff to understand psywar.  The real hostility came from the civil 
authorities, who apparently refused to wage a propaganda campaign, a huge irritation 
for the military after the Foreign Office's insistence in Whitehall on keeping control 
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over propaganda policy.  Davy thought conditions in Cyprus to be ideal for exploiting 
tensions between groups within EOKA.  He was furious about the missed 
opportunities and especially with the Governor: 
 
 I have never once been consulted on the Civil side.  The Governor declined to 
 be briefed by me.  ...The result of this unsatisfactory operational situation is 
 that the few leaflets and tapes which are produced are devised on an ad hoc 
 basis, without adequate access to intelligence and unrelated to any overall 
 plan.  I am not aware of any black or grey propaganda being done at all.185 
 
The Directorate of Forward Plans and the authorities on Cyprus fundamentally 
disagreed about psywar's character.  Davy tried to persuade the Director of Operations 
and the Governor that psywar could be carried on regardless of the international 
situation, because such a campaign would only target EOKA.  In line with military 
doctrine, he drew a sharp line between political propaganda and psychological 
warfare.  Thus there was no need to be wary about debates in the Commons or at the 
United Nations.186  Here he seriously misread the conflict.  EOKA was running a 
sophisticated, international propaganda strategy.  Leslie Glass observed events on the 
island were constantly manipulated to impress overseas audiences, so separating 
military from political propaganda made no sense.  Davy also misunderstood the 
Cypriot audience.  He was wrong in arguing the insurgency bore similarities to 
Malaya and Kenya.  Glass understood most Greek Cypriots supported enosis, whereas 
EOKA itself was smaller and more tightly organised than the Malayan Communists 
or the Mau Mau, making communication with them via propaganda very difficult.  In 
addition to these divergences about the conflict's character, the Colonial 
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Office/Foreign Office and Directorate of Forward Plans clashed because their 
knowledge about what propaganda activities were in train differed.  Little did Davy 
know, the Colonial and Foreign Offices directed extensive covert propaganda.  This 
included forged leaflets, fake letters, appeals by front organisations, and rumour 
campaigns.  Only the most senior military commanders were informed.187 
 
Soldiers felt civilians were letting them down in the propaganda war, yet the dictates 
of sound covert propaganda technique prevented them from knowing how much effort 
in fact went into defending them.  Glass and Davy did agree on the need for further 
propaganda in early 1959, and independently suggested similar ways to organise it 
under a civilian director.  By late April these ideas were redundant as the conflict was 
settled.  The Directorate of Forward Plans abolished their staff officer post in the 
Middle East and put its Cyprus equipment into storage.188  The dispute over whether 
propaganda could only be conducted where a diplomatic strategy for ending a conflict 
existed was never resolved in Cyprus.  The episode starkly demonstrated the clash 
between high political concerns for the diplomatic implications of propaganda versus 
disquiet on the ground that military morale was under threat. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Psychological warfare gradually assumed greater prominence in British strategy in the 
Middle East in the early Cold War.  Change came slowly because powerful voices in 
both the armed forces and the Foreign and Colonial Offices harboured reservations 
about the tactic’s effectiveness and moral probity.  Turf-wars between the military 
and the Foreign and Colonial Offices cannot fully account for the repeated 
	 31 
	
controversies over the tactic.  These disputes were about the political, moral and 
operational characteristics of psychological warfare.  Personnel within the Directorate 
of Forward Plans and a few key commanders with psywar experience, such as 
Templer, were the only consistent advocates.  At times the Chiefs of Staff used a 
perceived vulnerability to Soviet and Egyptian propaganda as an excuse to expand 
their powers over regional strategy, at the expense of the civilian departments.  
Psywar expanded very slowly within defence planning before the Suez crisis because 
most senior officers accepted the Foreign Office's claim to supremacy over what they 
deemed a distasteful practice.  American operations in Korea and British experience 
in Malaya began to change attitudes.  Only the Suez disaster provoked a step-change.  
Bitter over Colonel Nasser's survival and expanding propaganda assault on Britain’s 
position in the region, military and civilian leaders came to appreciate psywar could 
be a valuable tool in their arsenal. 
 
The realisation of the need to have a capability in the region to counteract Egypt, the 
Soviet Union and the Yemen in propaganda terms was a matter of broad agreement 
between the services and the civilian departments.  The changing threat environment 
was soon reflected in the new defence policy, which put a premium on cheaper 
alternatives to a large conscript army.  Psywar assets were used operationally in the 
Middle East just as the Sandys review came into play.  The Directorate of Forward 
Plans tried to take advantage of the opportunity to demonstrate their tactic's value.  
Unfortunately for them, the operations in Oman, Aden and Cyprus could not 
conclusively show any contribution to strategic outcomes.  Another Malaya simply 
failed to materialise.  Psywar survived these results because its practitioners were 
normally quite careful to avoid raising expectations too far.  Failures could be blamed 
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on others, such as the difficult Sultan in Oman, and in any case psywar seldom made 
matters dramatically worse.  So far as Aden was concerned, military propaganda did 
appear to make a difference in boosting local allies' morale. 
 
In Oman and Aden psychological warfare came into play thanks to support from the 
Foreign Office and Colonial Office representatives in charge.  Psywar provoked less 
controversy in these places because the purpose, target and extent of propaganda was 
agreed upon by all those involved.  In Cyprus acrimony developed when the armed 
forces felt the civilian organisations were failing to protect them from EOKA 
propaganda.  The Governor and his officials (including his senior military advisers) 
insisted the diplomatic imperative to avoid damaging Britain's international position 
and negotiating stance trumped tactical military considerations.  If they had shared 
with Directorate of Forward Plans officials the extent of the covert propaganda they 
were undertaking at the same time, a more trusting relationship might have ensued.  
Where the Directorate underestimated the dangers in countering EOKA propaganda 
more vigorously, colonial officials took military morale for granted.  Soldiers in a 
modern society themselves constituted an element of public opinion.  The military 
were not a hermetically-sealed community: this was the reason why propaganda by 
the armed forces was, and remains, a politically contentious undertaking.  Cyprus was 
a harbinger of things to come: in Aden in the 1960s and Northern Ireland in the 1970s 
the old barrier between local and international audiences also ceased to be 
meaningful.  Yet again, soldiers demanded defensive propaganda to protect them 
from demoralising smears, without much interest in the political consequences.  The 
persistence of psychological warfare into the post-colonial era was reflected in other 
areas in defence and foreign policy, such as covert action.189 
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Psychological warfare’s survival, despite moral qualms and obvious shortcomings 
when put into practice, says something significant about British defence in the early 
Cold War.  Strategists could not afford to jettison a potentially valuable tactic, 
however ignoble or unproven, at a critical time for re-establishing Britain’s 
credentials as a global power.  Though used in both world wars and since, the 
compelling reason for psywar blossoming in both planning and on operations after 
1956 was the urgent desire to overcome the humiliation of Suez.  As conscription and 
the occupation of Egypt came to an end the political and military elite cast around for 
new means to remain a world power – whether building up the Cyprus base or more 
nuclear weapons.  Psychological warfare’s growth in the 1950s is evidence for the 
dedication amongst policy-makers to hold onto a global status.  Whether military 
propaganda worked mattered far less than its representation of national ambition. 
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